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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. FLICK,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs •
Civil No. 14154
GLEN VAN TASSELL, and VAN'S
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

'POINT ONE. A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED TO
"APPELLANT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS COURT MISCONCEIVED THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF BEING SOUGHT
AND IN LIGHT OF RECENT OPINIONS OF THIS COURT
GRANTING RELIEF FROM DEFAULT JUDGMENTS.
The opinion of this court filed March 5, 1976 succinctly states the facts of this appeal.

The dates cited

by the court are correct since they give the chronology
of the events starting from the Notice of Appeal to the
date of Argument.

However, if there is any implied im-

pression that a delay occurred in the prosecution of this
appeal, it must be remembered that appellant's former
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counsel controlled the appeal up until the first of
February, 1976 when appellant's present counsel entered
its appearance.

Thus, any delay in the appellate

process

was caused by appellant's former counsel just as the failure in the lower court to answer the interrogatories and
appear at trial was caused by the advice and conduct of
such counsel.
Appellant believes that this court's opinion concerning
general rules of law as to matters beyond the record is absolutely correct and should be applied in 99% of any cases
where the record is to be supplemented.

However, this case

is in the 1% exception where the court's equity power must
be applied.

The reason for this exception is simple: when

a fraud or perpetration of a fraud is committed at the lower
court level and at the same time the record of the lower
court is established by the perpetrators, it is only
logical that the record will be devoid of any showing of
this wrongful conduct.

This, of course, could only occur

when the acts or omissions were made by the trial attorneys or the trial court who can effectively prevent the
record from revealing the true nature of any malpractice
or misfeasance.

In this case, for example, the trial court
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was perfectly justified in ruling as it did with the record
which was presented before it by the perpetrator of the
fraud and misrepresentation.

It was only after the defen-

dant consulted with new counsel who was not a party to
this gross neglect and malpractice that the errors could
be raised and supplemented into the record.
This court in its opinion continually states that
allowing affidavits of "losers" to supplement the record
would destroy the sanctity of a judgment.

This too is a

correct statement that should be applied in the large
majority of cases.

So too, this Court states that such

affidavits without the benefit of "cross examination" or
an "evidentiary hearing" would be a miscarriage of justice
and could allow a litigant to complain about his counsel
after a bad result was obtained and procure himself a
new trial.

Appellant has no argument with these state-

ments .
Two things should be considered in this particular
case, however.

First, the case involved a default judgment

where the litigant, John Van Tassell, never once personally
appeared before the trial court so that any representations
or failures to appear were performed solely by his counsel.
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Second, defendant is not appealling from the judgment itself
but is appealling from the motion to reconsider the granting
of the default.

Defendant is not, as the Court's opinion

seems to indicate, asking for a new trial but is only asking
for a new hearing before the trial court to determine whether
the judgment should be set aside.
Such a hearing would allow sufficient cross examination and evidence to be made part of the record so that
the trial court can adequately evaluate the correct grounds
of appeal based upon the appellant's former counsel's gross
neglect and negligence which was not before it at the first
hearing.

A hearing on a Rule 6OB Motion (where a judgment

has been entered) is hardly the equivalent of a new trial
(where both sides are able to go into the proceeding with
a clean slate).
Finally, it should be pointed out that the affidavits
filed in this case are not made solely by the losing party,
Glen Van Tassell.

Robert Sykes, a practicing and licensed

lawyer in the state of Utah who was associated with one of
the appellant's former counsel, substantiates the affidavit
of the defendant.

Some weight must be given to the axiom

that Lawyers are reluctant to testify against one another

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
- 4 -may contain errors.

unless there is some extreme reason compelled by basic
justice and morality.
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attorney filed motions for summary judgment against Slavens.
No objections were filed on behalf of Slavens.

Several

months later a new attorney was retained by Slavens who
filed an amended pleading together with an affidavit.
The trial court held that because there did not appear in
the record to be any justification for Slavens failure to
appear at the deposition and produce the documents he would
order Slavens1 answer to be strickened and his default entered.

This court in reversing the trial court's decision

and the entry of the default judgment stated
"Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law
is the principal that reason and justice shall
prevail over the arbitrary and uncontrolled
will of any one person; and that this applies
to all men in every status: to courts and
judges, as well as to monarchs and magistrates.
The meaning of the term "discretion" itself
imports that the action should be taken within
reason and good conscience in the interest of
protecting the rights of both parties and
serving the ends of justice. It has always
been the policy of our law to resolve doubts
in favor of permitting parties to have their
day in court on the merits of a controversy.
Similarly, appellant, Van Tassell, would urge that his
failure to appear at trial and to answer the interrogatories
was no different than Slavens1 failure to appear at a deposition and that both men had no counsel of record at the

~6-
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time of crucial proceedings involving the merits of their
case.

The only difference between the Slavens case and

this case is that Slavens was lucky enough to obtain counsel who established some record in the district court
before going on appeal.

In the instant case, however,

appellant, Van Tassell, was not so lucky and was forced to
submit affidavits to this court to consider under its equity
power.

This Court too has "discretion" in allowing at

least a hearing on the Motion to Set Aside the Default so
that the truth of the previous delays can be adjudicated.
The Michelson case is also appropriate for this court
to consider.
dant.

In that case an answer was filed by the defen-

Approximately five pre-trial conferences were scheduled

but none were attended for various reasons.

On March 21st

counsel for the defendant withdrew and counsel for the
plaintiff served notice to the defendant to obtain new
counsel.

On April 5th no one appeared at the pre-trial

conference and the court continued the matter without date.
On April 10th the counsel for plaintiff notified the defendant that the conference scheduled for April 12th had been
cancelled and that the judge would reschedule the hearing.
On November 11th the counsel for plaintiff mailed a notice
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of readiness for trial to the defendants and on December
10th the court set the matter for pre-trial on January 3rd,
On this date the counsel for plaintiff appeared at the
pre-trial but the defendants did not appear and the case
was set for trial on January 22, 19 75.

Notice of the

trial setting was mailed by the clerk on January 14, 1975.
At trial only the plaintiff and his counsel appeared at
trial.

Testimony was given and judgment rendered against

the defendants in the amount of $20,000 principal and $4,000
interest.
After the default judgment had been taken, the
defendant moved for a new trial and filed affidavits
showing the circumstances of his being unavailable at
the trial.

The trial court denied the motion for a new

trial and an appeal was taken.

The majority of this court

remanded the case to the district court stating "it seems
to us in view of all the circumstances in this matter that
the court abused its discretion in trying ' to set aside
the judgment".
The failure of Michelson to attend his trial is no
different from Van Tassell's failure except that the
record for such failure in Michelson was presented before
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the trial court and not before this Court.

Once again,

Michelson was lucky in having competent trial counsel who
established the lower court record and who did not actually
cause the entry of default.
A fact this Court should also consider in its equity
power is that the judgment entered in the present appeal
greatly exceeds both Michelson and Carman since it involves
over $300,000 in affirmative damages against the appellant
and a loss of at least $200,000 from valid claims appellant
has against the respondent.
There has been no showing of prejudice to the plaintiffrespondent if the district court is given an opportunity to
review the circumstances surrounding the failure to attend
the trial and to answer the interrogatories.

Certainly,

when this much money is involved and there are affidavits
and statements of lawyers in the record supporting defendants1 contention that he was misrepresented and misled
by his counsel and cases from other jurisdictions granting
relief from gross neglect of a litigant's counsel, a
remand to the district court is, as Justice Crockett in
the Carman case stated, "within reason and good conscience
in the interest of protecting the rights of both parties
in serving the ends of justice".
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant would respectfully submit that this Court
reconsider its previous opinion in light of the fact that
a new trial is not being sought and that appellant is only
seeking an opportunity to have an "evidentiary hearing"
concerning the circumstances surrounding the record at the
time the trial court denied the motions to set aside the
default judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
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Craig S. Cook
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